At Risk Patients and Doctors: Why Increased Agency Enforcement and Private Causes of Action Under the Supremacy Clause are Needed to Protect Medicaid Providers and Beneficiaries by Clark, Steven
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 101 | Issue 1 Article 7
2012
At Risk Patients and Doctors: Why Increased
Agency Enforcement and Private Causes of Action
Under the Supremacy Clause are Needed to
Protect Medicaid Providers and Beneficiaries
Steven Clark
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Clark, Steven (2012) "At Risk Patients and Doctors: Why Increased Agency Enforcement and Private Causes of Action Under the
Supremacy Clause are Needed to Protect Medicaid Providers and Beneficiaries," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 101 : Iss. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol101/iss1/7
NOTES
At Risk Patients and Doctors: Why Increased
Agency Enforcement and Private Causes of Action
Under the Supremacy Clause are Needed to Protect
Medicaid Providers and Beneficiaries
Steven Clark'
INTRODUCTION
T wo recent developments have raised important questions about the
ability of the Medicaid program to continue to pursue meaningfully
its goal of providing health care services to the nation's most impoverished
people. First, on May 6, 2011, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), a division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) which is responsible for oversight of state Medicaid
provider payment rate-setting, invoked its rulemaking power for the first
time to propose regulations aimed at helping CMS fully implement the
Equal Access provision of the Medicaid Act.' Second, on February 22, 2012,
the Supreme Court decided Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern
California, a case in which Medicaid providers challenged California state
budget cuts reducing the amount of Medicaid reimbursement.3 The
providers argued that California's budget cuts violated the Equal Access
provision of Medicaid ("§ 30(A)") 4 which requires that providers be paid
well enough to ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries have "care and services"
equivalent to "the general population in the geographic area."' The
providers further urged that these state budget cuts were in violation of
federal law under the Supremacy Clause.
6
i JD, expected May 2013, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Nicole Huberfeld for her assistance with this note.
2 Medicare Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76
Fed. Reg. 26,342 (proposed May 6, 2o11) [hereinafter Covered Medicaid Services] (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447).
3 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 12o8 (2012).
4 Brief of Respondents at i8, Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL
3319553.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3o)(A) (2oo6).
6 See Brief of Respondents, suprd note 4, at 41,45.
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The Equal Access provision of Medicaid is essential to Medicaid's goal
of providing health care to America's poorest and most needy citizens-the
chronically ill, pregnant women, seniors, and children.7 A failure to enforce
the Equal Access provision would have resulted in continued state budget
cuts to Medicaid provider reimbursement rates, which would have in turn
led to providers limiting the number of Medicaid patients they see or even
opting out of treating Medicaid patients altogether.8
This note will focus on how best to ensure the continued viability of
Medicaid's Equal Access provision, thereby preserving adequate health
care for America's sickest and most vulnerable citizens. Part I provides
a brief history of the Medicaid program and its purposes. Part II will
examine private causes of action to enforce the Equal Access provision
under § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause. Part III will focus on the Obama
Administration's newly proposed access regulations and ways to improve
their deficiencies.
Finally, Part IV will argue that although the proposed regulations are
a positive step, much more is needed to ensure that they are effective in
providing equal access to Medicaid beneficiaries. The regulations should be
revised to afford less discretion to the states in their'methods of measuring
equal access and to increase agency enforcement to ensure state compliance
with the regulations. Further, the courts should continue to allow private
causes of action under the Supremacy Clause to aid agency enforcement
by helping to identify unlawfully low provider reimbursement rates that
threaten Medicaid providers' and beneficiaries' equal access rights.
I. MEDICAID BACKGROUND
A. The History and Purpose of Medicaid
Prior to 196S, America suffered from a "dual-track" system of health
care.9 The wealthy were able to afford a high standard of care, while the
7 See Diane Rowland, Medicaid at Forty, 27 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 2005-2oo6,
at 63, available at https://www.cms.gov/HealthCareFinancingReview/downloads/o5-o6Win-
pg63.pdf (describing Medicaid's purpose to provide care for the "medically indigent"); see
also Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid
Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413,418-19 (2oo8) (explaining that Medicaid was intended
to provide healthcare only for the Nation's "deserving poor").
8 See Kevin Sack & Robert Pear, States Consider Medicaid Cuts as Use Grows, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 20o, at Ai, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oIo/o2/19/us/politicsl9medicaid.
html, for the story of Dr. John Beck, a Wichita ophthalmologist who treated Medicaid patients
for -yeaTs before Kansas's latest state budget cuts lowtemd his payment rates to where he could
no longer afford to treat Medicaid patients.
9 John V. Jacobi, Mission andMarkets in Health Care: Protecting Essential Community Provid-
ersfor the Poor, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1431, 1435 (1997); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Comment, Payments
to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the "Equal Access" Provision, 73 U. CI. L. REv. 673, 673-75
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poor were left at the mercy of "poor clinics and charity hospitals."' I0 The
Medicaid Act, enacted in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act, was
viewed as a remedy to "dual-track" health care and was intended to provide
health care services to the nation's poorest and most needy citizens."
Over its forty-seven years, Medicaid grew into the nation's largest health
care program.'2 While remaining a program for impoverished people,
Medicaid expanded its coverage beyond simply the poorest segments of
the population to include many working class families. 3 In fact, due to
the current economic recession, Medicaid enrollment recently exceeded
fifty million individuals for the first time in the program's history. 4 The
program's average monthly enrollment was expected to exceed fifty-five
million in 2011.1s
Medicaid is a cooperative program between the federal government and
the states. 6 Such joint federal-state programs are commonly referred to
as "cooperative federalism."' 7 Through Medicaid, the federal government
provides funds to states to facilitate "medical care to needy individuals." 8
Essentially, a state voluntarily agrees to enact a "state plan" that conforms
to the strictures of the Medicaid Act; if these requirements are met, the
government then subsidizes a majority of the state's plan.19 The shared
administrative and funding duties of the federal and state governments in
Medicaid have been considered a "source of tension" since the program's
inception. 0
(2oo6).
1o Jacobi, supra note 9, at 1435.
ii See Rowland, supra note 7, at 63; see also Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 418-19.
12 See Rowland, supra note 7, at 63.
13 See Medicaid Matters: Understanding Medicaid's Role in Our Health Care System, KAISER
FAmiLv FOUND. (Mar. 2oiI), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8165.pdf.
14 See Medicaid Enrollment: December 2oio Data Snapshot, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Dec.
2O1 I), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8o5o-o4.pdf.
15 John K. Iglehart, Expanding Eligibility, Cutting Costs-A Medicaid Update, 366 NEW
ENGL. J. MED. 105, 105 (2012).
16 See42 U.S.C. § 1396b(p)(i) (2oo6).
17 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
I8 See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (199o); see also Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 3p8 (I98O).
19 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(i) (2oo6); see also Michael A. Platt, Comment, Westside Mothers
and Medicaid- Will this Mean the End of Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Using
Section 1983?, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 273, 298-99 (zool) (analogizing a state's Medicaid plan to a
contract between the state and the federal government).
2o Iglehart, supra note 15.
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B. Medicaid's EqualAccess Provision
The federal government has given the states considerable flexibility to
administer their Medicaid programs."1 Through Medicaid demonstration
waivers," states may determine delivery systems for health care, enact
methods for enrolling providers, and modify provider payments. 3 However,
this flexibility afforded to the states does not go unchecked. Whatever
changes a state may make to its Medicaid program, that program must still
meet the "equal access" provision of the Medicaid Act. 4
Section 30(A) requires that a state Medicaid plan:
[P]rovide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization
of, and the payment for, care and services available under the
plan ... as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary
utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments
are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and
are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services
are available under the plan at least to the extent that such
care and services are available to the general population in the
geographic area."
Section 30(A) should not be viewed as a particularly harsh rule or one that
handcuffs the states. As long as a state meets the requirements of § 30(A),
it will be given significant leeway to maximize the value of its Medicaid
spending through its rate policies.2 6
1. History of Medicaid's Equal Access Provision.-The Medicaid Act has
long realized the importance of provider payment levels sufficient to
assure access, quality, and efficiency. 7 Shortly after the law's enactment
21 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985).
22 Section II 15 of the Social Security Act allows the Secretary of HHS to waive certain
requirements of the Medicaid Act in order to allow states to use federal Medicaid funds in
ways typically not allowed under the Medicaid Act. See Five Key Questions andAnswers About
Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FoUND. (June 2011), http://www.
kff.org/medicaid/upload/8196.pdf. Section I 115 demonstration waivers are required to remain
budget neutral. Id.
23 See id.; see also Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 431,
447-48 (2o1) (describing the different waiver variations and the flexibility they provide
states). Huberfeld explains that so many different forms of waivers exist "because the states
are always seeking more flexibility in Medicaid." Id.
24 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (zoo6).
25 Id.
26 See Covered Medicaid Services, supra note 2, at 26,342. Although Covered Medicaid
Services are proposed regulations, the general information section of the regulations explains
that under the current rule of § 3o(A), states are free to seek best value through payment rate
and access strategies. Id.
27 See DeGregorio v. O'Bannon, 500 F. Supp. 541, 549 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 198o) (explaining
that Medicaid equal access language first appeared in 1966 in the HHS Handbook of Public
[Vol. 1o1
AT RISK PATIENTS AND DOCTORS
in 1965, early statements of provider payment policies contained equal
access language.2 8 In 1979, equal access assurance was incorporated
into program regulations. 9 Throughout this early period in Medicaid's
history, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
was responsible for determining whether a "state plan" satisfied federal
standards.3"
In 1980, due to concern over rising health care costs, Congress passed
the Boren Amendment. 31 This amendment to the Medicaid Act was meant
to address waste in hospital and nursing home care. 31 It facilitated state
experimentation with payment models for the purpose of cost-containment.
States became free to set rates on a statewide basis, or on an institutional
basis, and Medicaid rates no longer had to abide by Medicare rate-setting
principles.3  Boren also shifted the responsibility of determining whether
"state plans" satisfied federal standards, including that reasonable provider
rates were in place to ensure equal access, from the Secretary to the states.34
Under Boren, the Secretary could only reject a "state plan" if it was clear
on its face that the state's assurance of reasonable provider rates was false.
Essentially, the Secretary's role in ensuring equal access was rendered
nugatory.
The Boren Amendment proved successful in its goal of facilitating
state experimentation with cost reduction; however, it also spurred legal
challenges from hospitals and nursing homes contesting the rate-setting
methods states employed under Boren.35 Boren was aimed at increasing
state flexibility in order to encourage efficiency and economy, but providers
and beneficiaries were still supposed to be protected from arbitrary
Assistance Administration, Supplement D, § D-5320. 1).
28 Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid Payment Rate Lawsuits: Evolving Court Views Mean Uncertain
Future for Medi-Cal, CAL. HEALT1CARF FOUND. 1, 3 (Oct. 2OO9), http://www.chcf.org/-/media/
MEDIA%2oLIBRARY%2oFiles/PDF/M/ PDF%2oMediCalProviderRateLitigation.pdf.
29 Encouragement of Provider Participation, 42 C.F.R. § 447.zo4 (zo i).
30 See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 527 (1990).
31 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of i98o, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 962(a), 94 Star. 2599,
2623-65 (1 980) (repealed 1997).
32 See Brietta Clark, MedicaidAccess, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: How the Obama Admin-
istration Is Undermining Its Own Health Reform Goals, 55 How. L.J. 771, 797-98 (201z).
33 See id. at 798-99. Although the Medicaid Act did not create a uniform system of rate-
setting, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, a precursor to HHS, insti-
tuted a "de facto parity standard that deemed Medicare rates presumptively reasonable for
Medicaid." Id. at 796-97.
34 See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 527.
35 Clark, supra note 32, at 799;see Malcolm J. Harkins III, Be Careful What You Ask For: The
Repeal of the Boren Amendment and Continuing Federal Responsibility to Assure that State Medicaid
Programs Pay For Cost Effective Quality Nursing Facility Care, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'N 159,
159 (2001).
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budget cuts. 6 Legislative history shows that the Boren Amendment was
not intended to allow states to set rates "solely on the basis of budgetary
appropriations."37 Furthermore, Boren was "not intended to encourage
arbitrary reductions in payment that would adversely affect the quality
of care."38 Boren did not alter the expectation that states would set rates
sufficient to ensure equal access.
The Boren Amendment's intention of avoiding state cuts based on
budgetary concerns was undercut by the broad discretion it allowed states
in determining provider payment levels. States were free to formulate
whatever rate-setting policy they wanted so long as they made "findings"
and assured the Secretary that their rates were sufficiently "reasonable
and adequate" to cover the costs of providers.39 However, states were also
allowed to establish their own criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of
their methodologies, which were subject to no real oversight. It was not
uncommon for states to set provider payment rates without conducting any
analysis whatsoever to ensure that the rates were sufficient for providers
to be able to maintain quality of care and thus ensure equal access for
beneficiaries. 40
In 1989, in response to low provider participation in Medicaid partially
caused by deficient provider payment rates, Congress was forced to take
legislative action to abate a growing access problem. 4' The result was
the codification of § 30(A), Medicaid's Equal Access provision, into the
Medicaid Act itself.4 Ironically, the equal access language employed in §
30(A) was taken from the same ineffectual Health and Human Services
regulatory fabric that had been in existence since 1966.
4
1
2. The Failure of § 30(A).-Whereas the Boren Amendment only covered
the rate-setting procedures of hospitals and nursing homes, § 30(A) was not
limited to specific services or providers." Under § 30(A), the states were no
longer required to make the perfunctory findings that their payment levels
36 See Harkins III, supra note 35, at 203.
37 See Clark, supra note 32, at 799.
38 See Harkins Ill, supra note 35, at 173.
39 See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 198o, Pub. L. No. 96-499, §962(a), 94 Stat. 2599,
2650-51 (1980) (repealed 1997).
40 See Clark, supra note 32, at 8oo.
41 See id. at 785; see also Moncrieff, supra note 9, at 686. Rep. Henry A. Waxman stated
that "the one complaint [Congressman] hear most is the rate of payment." Medicare andMed-
icaid Initiatives: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, ioist Cong. 113 (1989).
42 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX30WA (aoo6).
43 See Encouragement of Provider Participation, 4, C.F.R. § 447.204 (20 11); see also Sara
Rosenbaum, Medicaid and Access to Health Care-A Proposal for Continued Inaction?, 365 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 102, 102-04 (2011).
44 See Clark, supra note 32, at 8oo.
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were consistent with quality of care mandated by the Boren Amendment.4"
Section 30(A) did, however, require the states to submit assurances to the
Secretary that their rates were sufficient to enlist providers.
6
Medicaid's latest equal access mandate failed to gain any significant
ground over its failed regulatory predecessors. 47 Although § 30(A) required
assurances from the states to the federal government, it failed to require
any meaningful presentation by the states of the findings and data that
formed the basis of their assurances. 8 Additionally, the Secretary was not
required to review the reasoning behind state assurances. 49 At least some of
the blame for the ineffectiveness of § 30(A) can be attributed to Congress
for its failure to provide for significant enforcement of the provision."
Subsequent administrations' inability (or unwillingness) to enforce the
statute has further contributed to the ineffectiveness of § 30(A). sl These
administrations have declined to make efforts to firmly implement § 30(A).
The equal access question is complex and a number of variables must
be considered in determining whether provider payments are sufficient.
Despite the heightened need for guidance due to the complexity of
the issue, until recently, no administration had issued regulations aimed
at providing any metrics to ensure that the statute would be enforced.5"
Lacking any meaningful metrics or research, CMS has no means to ascertain
whether Medicaid beneficiaries are receiving access to the quality of care
to which they are entitled.
A recent report to Congress by the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and
Access Commission laments that "there is no easily accessible source of
state payment methods, no comprehensive analysis of which are more or
less effective, and no uniform data that permit meaningful comparisons of
payment levels."53 To summarize, "[M]eaningful federal enforcement...
has been utterly absent."
54
3. Negative Effects of Inadequate Federal Enforcement of § 30(A).-The recent
economic recession has led many states to consider or to enact significant cuts
45 See id.
46 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
47 See Rosenbaum, supra note 43, at to ("Congressional intervention did not, however,
serve as a wake-up call.").
48 See Clark, supra note 32, at 8o.
49 See id.
50 See Harkins III, supra note 35, at 2 16.
51 See Rosenbaum, supra note 43, at 102.
52 See id.
53 MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 158 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
MACPAC-2oI i-o3/pdf/GPO-MACPAC-20I I-03.pdf.
54 Rosenbaum, supra note 43, at io2.
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to their Medicaid programs.55 Furthermore, states facing budget deficits are
increasingly likely to target cuts in Medicaid provider payments as a means
of stretching their Medicaid dollars.16 A lack of federal enforcement of §
30(A) makes it all too easy for states to cut provider reimbursement rates.
In fact, states looking to reduce their Medicaid spending often find that the
simplest cut they can make is to lower provider payment rates.57 The quick
fix of decreasing provider payment rates has the end result of impairing the
ability of the Medicaid program to function effectively. Medicaid is already
notorious for its low levels of provider reimbursement-it pays less than
Medicare and private insurance (and often pays less than the actual cost
to the provider). 8 The result of further cuts to the program is that many
doctors simply decide they can no longer afford to treat Medicaid patients.5 9
When health care providers decide to opt out of treating Medicaid patients,
it poses the threat that states will fail in their duty to provide equal access
under § 30(A).
II. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF § 3o(A), MEDICAID'S EQUAL
ACCESS PROVISION
The paucity of federal enforcement of § 30(A) has led numerous
beneficiaries and providers alike to seek recourse in the federal courts
when states make cuts to provider payments that threaten the equal access
provision in violation of federal law.' Problematically, Medicaid contains no
enforcement procedure for providers and beneficiaries who do not receive
the payments or benefits required under the program.61 Therefore, private
actions to enforce the equal access requirements of § 30(A) primarily take
one of two more circuitous paths: either through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("1983")6z
55 See Sack and Pear, supra note 8.
56 See Rosenbaum, supra note 43, at 02--04 ("iSltates are espeeiaiiY prone to cut Medic-
aid provider payments because of grim financial conditions.").
57 Bradley J. Sayles, Preemption or Bust: A Review of the Recent Trends in Medicaid Preemption
Actions, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 120, 121 (2010) (citation omitted).
58 See Sack and Pear, supra note 8.
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996); Wood v.
Tompkins, 33 F3d 6oo, 6ol (6th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Whitburn, o F3d 1315 (7th Cir. 1993),
Ark. Med. Soc'y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 E3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993).
61 See Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 416-i 7.
62 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2oo6) now reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or othet person withiu the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the parry injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capac-
ity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable.
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or through the Supremacy Clause.' The following two sections of this
note will briefly explore the contours of private actions to enforce § 30(A)
through § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause while also exploring how recent
jurisprudential trends threaten to nullify these causes of action altogether.
A. Private Enforcement of§ 30(A) Through § 1983
Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.
64 It was, at its core, a reaction to the racial terrorism of the Ku Klux
Klan in the post-Civil War Southern United States. 6 Although § 1983 was
primarily intended to enforce civil rights in the postbellum South, its broad
language helped lead to an eventual expansion of the statute's scope to a
general civil rights statute.66 In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Maine
v. Thiboutot, which held that § 1983 creates a private cause of action for
violation of federal law by state officials. 67 In the years following the Court's
decision in Thiboutot, Medicaid providers and beneficiaries brought a
"steady stream of litigation" into federal courts to challenge state Medicaid
program limitations.
6
1
However, recent decisions by the Court have threatened the viability
of § 1983 as a means of enforcing Medicaid's "equal access" requirement.69
Private causes of action under § 1983 were dealt a severe blow with the
Supreme Court's ruling in Gonzaga v. Doe.70 In Gonzaga, the Court narrowed
the applicability of§ 1983 as an enforcement mechanism to situations where
Congress has created a new right in "clear and unambiguous terms."71 This
new focus on congressional intent has led the majority of circuit courts to
find that § 30(A) creates no enforceable rights for Medicaid beneficiaries
63 U.S. CONST., art. VI, c1. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides that
[tlhis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
64 Also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, § i (now known as § 1983), was intro-
duced by Rep. Samuel Shellabarger (R., Ohio); it was passed with little debate and without
amendment. Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978).
65 Id.
66 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
67 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. i, I (980).
68 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature of the Medicaid Entitlement, 22 HEALTH AFF.,
no. I, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 145, 145-48.
69 For an in depth account of the threats to the use of § 1983 to enforce Medicaid provi-
sions, see Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 417-18. Huberfeld explains that current Supreme Court
justices are critical of the use of § 1983 to enforce spending conditions and that the Court's
decision in Gonzaga University v. Doe vitiates § 1983 enforcement. Id.
70 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
71 Id. at z9o.
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under § 1983.72 The Eighth Circuit seems to be the only circuit still willing
to allow private causes of action under § 30(A) through § 1983. 7' Whatever
heft remains in § 1983 for Medicaid beneficiaries, it seems clear that its use
as an enforcement mechanism for § 30(A) stands on uneven ground-even
a step as drastic as overruling Thiboutot is not out of the question.
7 4
B. Private Enforcement of§ 30(A) Through the Supremacy Clause
1. The History of Private Actions Under the Supremacy Clause.-Similar to
the private cause of action to enforce § 30(A) through § 1983, the viability
of a private cause of action for a preemption claim under the Supremacy
Clause now stands on questionable ground. The vitiation of the private
cause of action under § 1983 has caused many Medicaid providers and
beneficiaries to seek judicial redress in federal courts for violations of §
30(A) through the alternative route of asserting a private cause of action
under the Supremacy Clause.7" The Ninth Circuit has explained that while
the Supreme Court in Gonzaga limited private actions under § 1983, the
Court has also "consistently reaffirmed the availability of injunctive relief"
against state officials that would implement state legislation in violation of
federal law.
76
Ironically, the seeds of a private cause of action to enforce § 30(A)
under the Supremacy Clause were sown during the same time period in
which the conservative Justices of the Supreme Court sought to foreclose
§ 1983 actions aimed at the same purpose.77 In 1983, the Court decided
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, which noted that it was "beyond dispute" that
injunctive relief could be sought under the Supremacy Clause to prevent
the implementation of a state regulation that was preempted by federal
law.78 In Shaw, the Court granted relief to a group of plaintiffs that claimed
that the New York statutes at issue in the case were preempted by federal
law.79 This decision strongly implied that the plaintiffs had a private cause
of action.
72 See Andrew R. Gardella, Note, The Equal Access Illusion: A Growing Majority of Federal
Courts Erroneously Foreclose Private Enforcement of § 1396a(A)(3o) of the Medicaid Act Using 4z
U.S.C. § 1983, 38 U. MEM. L. REv. 697, 706 (2oo8).
73 See Huberfeld, supra note 7, at 448-5o.
74 Lauren Saunders, Are there5 Votes to Overrule Thiboutot.,
, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 380,
381 (2oo6).
75 See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F3d 1050, 1059-63 (9th Cir. 2oo8).
76 Id. at 1o63.
77 See Rochelle Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption: Alternative Means of Court Accessfor
Safety Net Statutes, io Loy. J. PUB. INT. L. 27,45-46 (2oo8).
78 Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n. 14 (1983).
79 Id. at io8-o9.
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In 2002, the same year that the Court took some of the teeth out of
§ 1983 actions with its ruling-in Gonzaga, it also lent further credence to
preemption claims under the Supremacy Clause with its ruling in Verizon
Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission. 0 The Court reached a unanimous
decision on the merits of the preemption claim at issue while expressly
declining to offer an opinion on whether a private cause of action exists
under the Supremacy Clause.8 In fact, in nine different cases between
1996 and 2003, the Supreme Court reached the merits on private plaintiffs'
preemption claims without ever holding that the federal statute at issue
granted a private cause of action.
8
1
Whatever the reason may be for the Supreme Court's reluctance to
explicitly state that a private cause of action exists under the Supremacy
Clause, its jurisprudence in this area has sent an unmistakable message
to the lower courts that a private cause of action does, in fact, exist.8 3 The
Circuit Courts have "universally affirmed the right of private parties to
seek injunctive relief under the Supremacy Clause regardless of whether
the allegedly preemptive statute confers any federal 'right' or cause of
action."" There is no shortage of appellate precedent favoring preemption
claims by private parties."'
2. The Douglas Cases: The Supreme Court Considers Private Actions Under
the Supremacy Clause.-However favorable circuit court precedent may be
toward a private cause of action to enforce § 30(A) under the Supremacy
Clause, the Supreme Court appears comparatively ambivalent to actions
premised upon the Clause. One commentator has stated that the Supreme
Court's refusal to explicitly acknowledge a private right of action in its
Supremacy Clause cases is because "at least some of the Justices ... do not
want to encourage suits by individuals against the government.",
8o Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642-45 (2002).
81 Id.
82 Bobroff, supra note 77, at 60 (citing David Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory
Violations, 89 IowA L. REV. 355,366-67 (2004)).
83 See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3 d 1050, 1o58 (9 th Cir. 2oo8)
(explaining that it is a "well-established rule" in the circuits that an explicit conferral of a
private right of action is not necessary to claim injunctive relief under the Supremacy Clause).
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F 3 d iz58, IZ66 (ioth Cir. 2004) ("A
party may bring a claim under the Supremacy Clause that a local enactment is preempted
even if the federal law at issue does not create a private right of action."); Bud Antle, Inc. v.
Barbosa, 45 F3d 1261, 1269-72 (9th Cit. 1994) (citing Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96
n. 14 (1983)) (noting the "general rule that a private party may seek declaratory and injunctive
relief against the enforcement of a state statutory scheme on the ground of federal preemp-
tion."); see also Local Union No. 12004, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3 d
64, 75 (1st Cit.'2004) (holding that plaintiff may assert a claim for preemption even lacking an
explicit statutory cause of action).
86 Bobroff, supra note 77, at 6o-6i.
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. Against this unfavorable backdrop, the Supreme Court recently
decided a case challenging state budget cuts to provider payment levels
that had the potential to foreclose private actions under the Supremacy
Clause. 7 Douglas v. Independent Living Center consolidated three Ninth
Circuit cases, each of which addressed a dispute between the state of
California and its Medicaid providersA8 The providers argued that the
reimbursement cuts, enacted by statute in response to California's budget
crisis, were preempted by § 30(A) and were in violation of federal law for
threatening Medicaid beneficiaries' guarantee of "equal access" under §
30(A). 89 It appears that the plaintiffs in these cases-hospitals, physicians,
pharmacists, and Medicaid beneficiaries-had particularly strong claims as
California's provider payment rates "were already the lowest in the Nation
on an average per-enrollee basis" at the time the cuts were made." Despite
California's low payment rates, the state legislature, facing a budget crisis,
passed legislation reducing Medicaid provider reimbursement rates by ten
percent. 91
Any doubt that the Court would not address the private cause of action
issue was erased when certiorari was granted and limited to the first question
presented, 9 which framed the issue, "Whether Medicaid recipients and
providers may maintain a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to
enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) by asserting that the provision preempts a state
law reducing reimbursement rates?" 93
The Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari produced some
strange bedfellows in favor of, and against, a private cause of action under
the Supremacy Clause. Most shockingly, the Obama Administration issued
an amicus brief siding with the states and arguing against a private cause of
action to enforce § 30(A).' Sara Rosenbaum explains, "[the administration]
want[s] the prerogative of when and where to intervene in state conduct
87 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1205-06 (2o2).
88 Sara Rosenbaum, Equal Access for Medicaid Beneficiaries-The Supreme Court and the
Douglas Cases, 365 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2245, 2245 (2011).
89 Id.
90 Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents, Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (No. o9-958), 2011 WL 3439920
at *3-4.
9
i Explaining Douglas v. Independent Living Center: Questions about the Upcoming United
States Supreme Court Case Regarding Medicaid Beneficiaries and Providers' Ability to Enforce the
Medicaid Act, KAiSER FAirey FOUND., (Sep. 2011), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8240-2.
pdf.
92 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 992 (U.S. Jan. i8, 20 11) (No. 09-958).
93 Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 E3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009),petition
forcert. filed, 2010 WL 599171 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2oo) (No. 09-958).
94 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Indep. Living Ctr,
132 S.Ct. 1204 (No. 09 - 9 5 8),2o i WL 2I327o5 at *12.
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matters."95 The Administration's amicus brief pointed to proposed
regulations aimed at greater enforcement of § 30(A) as a reason to derogate
private actions under the Supremacy Clause.96 Professor Rosenbaum writes
that the new proposed access regulations were released "as if to bolster
the solicitor general's arguments [in Douglas]."'97 However, the proposed
regulations, as currently drafted, are insufficient to enforce § 30(A), as
discussed in Part Ill.
In an amicus brief equally as surprising as the Obama Administration's,
the Chamber of Commerce argued in favor of allowing a private cause of
action for Medicaid beneficiaries.9" As a conservative, free-market oriented
group, its position in favor of low-income Medicaid beneficiaries' rights
seems counterintuitive. However, Medicaid beneficiaries that bring private
actions to enforce § 30(A) are also necessarily protecting the interests
of private health organizations in receiving adequate payment rates. 99
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries are inextricably linked-spending
cuts that hurt providers' abilities to provide effective care (or any care at all
in some cases) affect beneficiaries by lowering their access to health care. It
can be said that there is no bright line to differentiate cuts that affect only
providers from those that impact patients.
Early developments in the Douglas case raised the possibility that the
Supreme Court might never have to reach a decision in the case.' 0 In its
brief to the Court after oral arguments had been heard, the United States
argued that California's spending cuts were being reviewed 'by federal
officials and that this review might make it unnecessary for the Justices
to hear the case."0 ' In a letter to the Court, Solicitor General Donald B.
Verrilli Jr. stated that CMS had approved California's spending cuts under
§ 30(A).102 In response to the Solicitor General's letter, the Supreme Court
95 Pema Levy, How the Obama Administration is Jeopardizing Health Care Reform, ThE NEW
REPUBLIC (Oct. 3, 2011, 12:oo AM), http:j/www.tnr.com/article/polifics/9563i/supreme-court-
case-medicaid-california-affordable-care-act.
96 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Indep. Living Ctr,
132 S. Ct. 1204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL 21327o5 at *12.
97 Rosenbaum, supra note 42, at 103; see Provider Payments and Access to Medicaid Services:
A Summary of CMS'May 6 ProposedRule, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (July 2011), http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/82o7.pdf (stating that the proposed rule was offered in response to litigation
by Medicaid providers and beneficiaries challenging state cuts to provider payment rates).
98 Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondents, Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (No. o9-958), 2011 WL 3439920
at *4-
99 See id. at *1-4 (explaining that § 3o(A) cases raise "issues of vital concern to the Na-
tion's business community").
I oo Lyle Denniston, New Briefs Due in Medicaid Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 4, 2011, 2:47
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/o1 I/1 I/new-briefs-due-in-medicaid-cases/.
io Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 93,
at *31-32.
i02 Letter from Donald B. Verilli, U.S. Solicitor Gen., to William K. Suter, U.S. Supreme
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issued an order directing the parties and the Solicitor General to file
supplemental briefs addressing what effect CMS's approval of California's
cuts should have on the case.1"3
3. The Douglas Deision.-On February 22, 2012, the Supreme Court
issued an opinion in Douglas."04 Justice Breyer authored the opinion of the
Court which decided by a vote of five to four to vacate the Ninth Circuit's
decisions and remand the cases for further proceedings."' 5 The Court found
that CMS's approval of the state Medicaid statutes at issue as consistent
with federal law warranted remand of the Court of Appeals' judgments
holding that federal law preempted the state statutes.' °6 The Ninth Circuit
will now determine whether the parties' dispute should be resolved under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and whether the cases can proceed
directly under the Supremacy Clause though CMS has already sanctioned
the state's actions.107
The narrow decision in Douglas did nothing to clarify whether Medicaid
providers and beneficiaries can continue to rely on private rights of action
under the Supremacy Clause to protect themselves from state budget cuts
in violation of federal law; that issue has been left to the Ninth Circuit
to decide. The Court's punting of the. larger issue means that Medicaid
providers and beneficiaries have not yet seen the courthouse doors slam
completely shut, but they may not remain open much longer." 8
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries are in danger of losing the ability
to enforce Medicaid's Equal Access provision through the judiciary. As
explained above, private causes of action under § 1983 and the Supremacy
Clause are threatened by recent developments in the Supreme Court.
Against the backdrop of the Court's proceedings in Douglas, the Obama
Administration released new proposed regulations aimed at finally
substantively defining the requirements and enforcement procedures for
§ 30(A), Medicaid's Equal Access provision."° The next part of this note
will explore the contents of the proposed regulations and explain how they
fall well short of protecting Medicaid providers and beneficiaries from
inadequate state funding of Medicaid.
Court Clerk (Oct. z8, 201i), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2oi i/i i/SG-letter-re-Calif-Medicaid-io-z8-i i i.pdf.
103 Opinion, Douglas v. Santa Rosa Mem'l Hosp., 132 S. Ct. 547 (zo i) (No. 1o-z83).
104 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
105 Id. at 1204.
io6 See id.
107 Id. at 2o i.
io8 See Denniston, supra note ion.
io9 Covered Medicaid Services, supra note 2, at 26,342.
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III. THE OBAMA ADMINIStRATION'S NEWLY PROPOSED
ACCESS REGULATIONS
A. Background of the Proposed Regulations
The Obama Administration's newly proposed regulations were written
to ensure that Medicaid patients have equal access to the kind of care §
30(A) and its predecessors have long promised. In particular, the proposed
rbgulations are designed to assure that state reimbursement methodologies
comply with § 30(A). The proposed regulations advance this objective by
suggesting additional data that will help inform whether enrollees' needs
are being met, providing access review timefranies, requiring public notice
of significant statewide changes in provider payment rates, and mandating
public input.
Both the Obama Administration's position in Douglas against a private
cause of action to enforce § 30(A) under the Supremacy Clause and its
support of CMS's proposed access regulations are closely related to its
goals with the Affordable Care Act ("ACN')." In 2014, the ACA could
expand Medicaid eligibility to 133% of the federal poverty level, possibly
incorporating up to an additional sixteen million people into the Medicaid
program."' The Obama Administration appears not to want private causes
of action potentially interfering with its own exclusive enforcement of the
ACA."2 To that end, the Administration's amicus brief in Douglas argued
that proposed federal regulations would provide the necessary guidance to
ensure enforcement of § 30(A)." 3
As part of the new proposed regulations on Medicaid access, CMS
solicited comments on the regulations' adequacy from the general public."4
As a result of CMS's solicitation, the agency received 193 public submissions
from various health care provider associations, hospitals, private health care
i io See Patent Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(zolo).
iii Provider Payments and Access to Medicaid Services: A Summary on CMS' May 6 Proposed
Rule, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., (July 201 i), http://www.kff.org/medicaidfupload/8zo7.pdf (ex-
plaining that the ACA includes an unprecedented expansion of Medicaid services to individu-
als under age 65 with income below 133% of the federal poverty level). But see Nat'l Fed'n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (finding that the federal government
could not expel states from Medicaid for refusing to comply with the Medicaid expansion).
For a discussion of how this unprecedented expansion has marked a "major philosophical
shift" in the Medicaid program from its traditional goal of providing assistance only to the
"deserving poor," see Huberfeld, supra note 23, at 432-33.
112 See Levy, supra note 95.
113 See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 94,
at *31-32.
114 Covered Medicaid Services, supra note 2, at 26,342.
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businesses, and state health care administrative agencies."' While the state
Medicaid agencies decried the additional administrative burdens of the
proposed regulations," 6 the majority of the submitted public comments
called for several measures needed to give the proposed regulations more
heft. 
117
B. Deficiencies in the Proposed Regulations
A review of submitted comments on CMS's new proposed regulations
shows that a number of concerns repeatedly manifest themselves, reflecting
the ways in which the proposed regulations are truly deficient. The most
common critiques included that the regulations need to expand to review
access for beneficiaries under Medicaid-approved managed care; that
the regulations should require input from physicians and other Medicaid
providers in addition to the required beneficiary input; that guidelines for
how to use input data to determine if there is an access problem need to be
defined; and that CMS require public notice of any state-enacted provider
payment cuts, not just those termed "significant."
1. The Proposed Regulations Do Not Cover Medicaid's Managed Care Plans.-
The most glaring deficiency in CMS's newly proposed "equal access"
regulations is that they simply do not apply to Medicaid's managed-care
arrangements." 8 Managed care is covered by a separate part of the Code of
Federal Regulations.' 19The proposed regulations apply to Fee-For-Service
Medicaid but will have no effect on managed care, which provides at least
some level of medical care to over seventy percent of the nation's Medicaid
beneficiaries.1 0 Medicaid programs in South Carolina and Tennessee have
fully implemented managed care, meaning that the proposed regulations
would be inapplicable to those two states.' The omission of standards for
managed care beneficiaries is an egregious error in the proposed regulations.
Significant numbers of Medicaid enrollees will continue to be effectively
deprived of the protection of § 30(A)'s "equal access" requirement.' 2 The
115 See CMS-2o1i-oo62 Docket Folder Summary, http://www.regulations.gov (search
"CMS-2o1 i-oo62", click on "Docket ID CMS-2o1 i-oo62" hyperlink, then click on "View
All" hyperlink.
ii6 Id.
1I7 Id.
1,8 See Provider Payments and Access to Medicaid Services: A Summary on CMS' May 6 Pro-
posedRule, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., (July 2oi i), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/82o7.cfm.
1 9 See Nicole Huberfeld, Post-Reform Medicaid Before the Court: Discordant Advocacy Re-
flects Conflicting Attitudes, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 513, 523 (2012).
120 Id.
121 MedicaidManagedCare Enrollees as a Percent of StateMedicaidEnrollees, as ofJuly 1, 2010,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=z 17&cat=4.
122 See Medicaid Defense Fund Letter from Lynn S. Carmam, Esq., to Sec'y of U.S.
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proposed regulations must be expanded to include Medicaid beneficiaries
under managed care plans.
2. The proposed regulations should require more concrete and relevant input from
thepublic.-The proposed regulations require Medicaid access reviews to
include only perfunctory beneficiary input. 3 Under the regulations, the
states would be required to have a mechanism for beneficiaries to provide
input such as "hotlines, surveys, ombudsman or another equivalent
mechanism."1 14 Beneficiary input is certainly important in determining
whether equal access exists, but the proposed regulations' nebulous input
requirements do little to ensure that meaningful beneficiary input will be
collected and imported into access reviews. In the proposed regulations,
HHS suggests collection of useful beneficiary data such as provider
turnover, distance from beneficiary home to provider, and beneficiary
knowledge of Medicaid services by provider.' These suggestions should
be fully implemented-having mere suggestions instead of concrete
requirements would continue to allow states to skate by CMS with hollow
assurances rather than true equal access.
Furthermore, an input mechanism for Medicaid providers and other
stakeholders must be inserted into the proposed regulations. As it is
currently drafted, CMS's proposed regulations only call for beneficiary
input. HHS has acknowledged that provider costs are closely related to
rate sufficiency,2 6 yet the new regulations fail to consider provider input
as an important element in rate-setting, despite data that shows that low
Medicaid reimbursement rates cause providers to opt out of Medicaid.2 7
Provider input is an efficient way for CMS to collect data on the sufficiency
of the reimbursement rates that are so inextricably linked to equal access
and it should be considered.
3. The proposed regulations afford the states too much discretion.-The
proposed regulations purport that their purpose is to "create a standardized,
transparent process for States to follow" as part of compliance with the
Medicaid Access Requirement.2 8 The new regulations would require
Dep't of Health and Human Servs. (July 5, 2oi ) (on file at http://www.regulations.gov/#!doc
umentDetail;D=CMS-2oi i-oo6-oj68).
123 Id.
124 Covered Medicaid Services, supra note 2, at 26,342 § 447.203(b)(4).
125 See Clark, supra note 32, at 839.
126 See Methodist Hosps. v. Sullivan, 91 F3d 1026, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1996).
127 One study has shown that the physician reimbursement rate is a statistically sig-
nificant predictor of drop-out. See Benjamin D. Sommers, From Medicaid to Uninsured-- Drop-
Out Among Children in Public Insurance Programs, 40 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 59, 76 n.7 (2005),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1361I26/#fn7 (finding that a $i
increase in reimbursement correlates to a 5.8% decrease in the drop-out rate).
128 Covered Medicaid Services, supra note 2, at 26,342.
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states to perform "medical assistance access reviews" of their Medicaid
services.129 Certain subsets of Medicaid services would have to be reviewed
every year, while every single service would have to be reviewed at least
once every five years.13°
Under the proposed regulations, a state attempting to reduce Medicaid
provider payment rates would be required to submit a State Plan
Amendment to CMS and an access review demonstrating compliance with
§ 30(A). 1 31 States would have twelve months to complete this review. 3 The
review would be required to reflect the state's consideration of beneficiary
and stakeholder input in its study of the effects of the rate cut on the access
required under § 30(A). 3 3 States would be required to make their access
review data available to the public through public records or websites on
a continuing basis. 134 Additionally, states would have to conduct ongoing
reviews on the effects of implemented rate reductions. 3  Finally, states
that discover deficiencies in access brought about by provider payment
reductions would be required to remediate any deficiency within twelve
months of its discovery.
1 36
The proposed access reviews force states to once again make tangible
"findings" that are similar, though greater in scope, than those formerly
required by the now-repealed Boren Amendment.'3 7 The proposed
regulations share the Boren Amendment's strengths, but they also
incorporate its weakness of affording the states too much discretion in
how they will satisfy procedural requirements. The proposed regulations'
entire data collection and utilization procedure remains ill-defined and it
continues to grant broad discretion to the states-the same problem that
has plagued § 30(A) and its predecessors since the dawn of Medicaid. 38
The states are left to decide which data should be collected, what methods
for assessing the data should be used in order to ascertain whether there is
an access problem, when corrective action should be taken, and what level
of public input is necessary. 39 The proposed regulations do little mote than
129 Id.
130 See Provider Payments and Access to Medicaid Services: A Summary on CMS' May 6 Pro-
posedRule, KAISER FAmiL Y FOUND., (July zo2 ), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8207.pdf.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
t37 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 198o Pub. L. 96-499, § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2599, 2650-51
(I98O) (repealed 1997).
138 See Clark, supra note 32, at 837-38.
139 See Covered Medicaid Services, supra note 2, at 26,345 (defining beneficiary proce-
dures as "suggestions.").
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reiterate the states' duty to make assurances to the Secretary that were
previously required under § 30(A).
The procedures of the proposed regulations will have to be strengthened
significantly if the regulations are to have any real impact on equal access.
CMS can continue to afford substantive flexibility to the states to determine
how best to administer their Medicaid programs. However, states should
no longer be given such absolute freedom to decide the procedures used
to measure equal access. As an administrative agency with considerable
expertise, it should be CMS that decides the particulars of an access
review. 140
4. The Proposed Regulations Only Require Public Notice of State Budget Cuts
to Medicaid Providers that the State Deems "Significant. "-Finally, CMS
should require public notice of any state budget cuts to Medicaid
provider payment rates, not just those it considers "significant." As CMS's
proposed regulations are currently drafted, public notice is required for
state changes to provider payment rates that are termed "significant.'
4'
Obviously, such a vague standard as "significant" presents an easy run-
around for states wishing to make cuts to provider payments. States could
implement cuts deemed not "significant" enough in order to avoid public
notice, which would in turn avoid other requirements of the regulations
such as beneficiary input. The vague and ineffectual standards repeatedly
employed in the proposed regulations create the general impression that
the regulations were devised almost as a ruse or as a means of temporarily
placating Medicaid beneficiaries and providers.
The aforementioned changes-the inclusion of access data for managed
care plans, broader public input, less state discretion, and increased public
notice of state cuts-must be made for the proposed regulations to have
any real heft. However, these changes alone will not be enough; the
federal government will have to make a greater effort to enforce its own
regulations than it has done in the past. The final part of this note urges
that improved agency enforcement combined with a private cause of action
under the Supremacy Clause will best ensure that Medicaid providers' and
beneficiaries' federal right to equal access is adequately protected.
140 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court's Assault on Litigation: Why (And How) It
MightBe Good For Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2323, 2330 (zoo).
141 See Covered Medicaid Services, supra note z, at 26,347.
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IV. THE NEED FOR AGENCY ENFORCEMENT AND A PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE TO PROTECT MEDICAID
PROVIDERS AND BENEFICIARIES
A. Agency Enforcement
Amending CMS's proposed regulations to include the above-suggested
improvements will be of little consequence if the regulations lack federal
enforcement. Unfortunately, the histories of the Boren Amendment and
§ 30(A) reveal that the federal government has failed to enforce equal
access requirements in the past.4 Numerous suits were brought under
the Boren Amendment because states failed to make the minimal findings
required under the Amendment.143 After the repeal of Boren, many courts
interpreted § 30(A) to include a similar requirement and similar suits were
brought under that statute. Regardless of whether § 30(A) requires states
to make findings of equal access,' 44 the APA sets a minimum requirement
that agency determinations must at least meet an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard. 145
Successful suits under these provisions intimate that agency enforcement
was deficient or, in some cases, nearly nonexistent. In Arkansas Medical
Society v. Reynolds, the Eighth Circuit decided that HHS/CMS's approval
of Arkansas's state budget cuts to Medicaid reimbursement rates failed
the arbitrary and capricious standard.14 This failure is especially troubling
because the arbitrary and capricious standard is highly deferential to an
agency's determinations.1 47 All an agency must do to satisfy the standard is
to articulate a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made." 148 An agency decision is arbitrary and capricious when it "entirely
fail[s] to consider an important aspect of the problem" or is "implausible." '149
Amending the proposed regulations to require more concrete
procedures and substantive findings rather than mere suggestions is
a necessary first step toward ensuring greater federal enforcement1 s0
142 See Frederick H. Cohen, An Unfulfilled Promise of the Medicaid Act: Enforcing Medicaid
Recipients' Right to Health Care, 17 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 375, 378 (2005).
143 See, e.g., Affiliates, Inc. v. Armstrong, 2oo9 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37136 , at *9 (D. Idaho
2009).
j44 See Methodist Hosps. v. Sullivan, 91 F3d 1026, 1029-30 (7th Cit. 1996).
145 5 U.S.C. § 7 o6(2)(A) (2006).
146 Ark. Med. Soc'y v. Reynolds, 6 E3d 519 (8th Cir. 1993).
147 See Bait. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 1o5 (1983).
148 Id.
149 O'Keefe's, Inc. v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 92 F3d 940, 942 (9th Cir.
1996) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)).
15o See Covered Medicaid Services, supra note 2, at 26,342.
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Increased regulatory guidance would send a message to the states that they
must actively demonstrate compliance. Furthermore, CMS would have
increased authority to reject state plans that fail to comply with regulations.
As it stands, so much discretion is granted to a state in its required access
reviews that CMS is unlikely to reject a state plan for fear of stepping on
a state's toes when, technically, the state has met the minimal procedures
required under the regulations."'
Oral argument in Douglas highlighted another impediment to effective
agency enforcement of equal access. In Justice Ginsburg's colloquy with
California's attorney, it was revealed that if a state institutes payment cuts
in violation of § 30(A) and no private cause of action exists for Medicaid
providers and beneficiaries, the federal government's only remedies
would be to seek an injunction in federal court or to terminate Medicaid
funding to the state altogether.' This line of questioning also revealed
the deficiencies inherent in both of these remedies. If injunction is
sought, the state's inadequate payment rates will remain in place while the
injunction is considered."5 3 On the other hand, completely cutting a state
off from Medicaid funding would be a drastic measure, one that the federal
government has never taken.'
The proposed regulations incorporate these same severe remedies. 5
The regulations should be amended to provide CMS with more flexible and
incremental remedies beyond these two options that hurt the beneficiaries
the regulations are supposed to protect. For one, the proposed regulations
should implement the remedial option of partial defunding. Furthermore,
as discussed infra, solidifying the procedural requirements for state access
reviews will facilitate consequential agency review of state plans that would
temper the need for the federal government to seek injunctions, thereby
preventing inadequate provider rates before they ever take effect and not
allowing them to persist, harming beneficiaries, while injunction is sought.
B. The Continuing Needfor a Private Cause ofAction Under the Supremacy Clause
The Supreme Court has long recognized the value of agency
expertise.156 The intricacies of provider costs, beneficiary access, and
rate-setting methodology fall more within the realm of CMS than that of
the federal courts. Courts have long deferred to agency determinations
151 See Clark, supra note 32, at 834-35.
152 See Rosenbaum, supra note 88, at 2246.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See Covered Medicaid Services, supra note 2. at 26,342.
156 See Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 554, 623 (1923) ( Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the value of "administrative machinery").
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and policy judgments.'57 Strengthening agency enforcement is the best
way to ensure that CMS's considerable expertise is put to good use. Still,
increased agency enforcement of the proposed regulations will best protect
the federal rights of Medicaid providers and beneficiaries if it is supported
by private causes of action under the Supremacy Clause.
A private cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce equal
access requirements is still needed because of the natural limitations of
CMS-it is an agency of limited resources. 58 The agency's limitations
are best explained in an amicus brief submitted by former HHS officials
in Douglas.5 9 The brief contended that CMS simply does not have the
staffing nor funding to fully ensure that states are meeting their equal
access obligations.l 6° In fact, the former officials stated that they welcomed
and relied on private causes of action to identify states that were failing to
provide adequate provider payment levels. 161
C. An Example of How Agency Enforcement and a Private Cause
of Action Might Work Together
If the deficiencies in the Obama Administration's proposed regulations
are properly addressed, increased agency enforcement combined with a
private cause of action will assure that Medicaid providers' and beneficiaries'
rights are protected more ardently and efficiently. The consolidated Douglas
cases involving California's budget cuts to reimbursement rates provide
a suitable example for analysis of how the approach offered in this note
might work in practice.
To begin with, under the proposed regulations, public notice would be
required for California's provider rate cuts at issue in Douglas. 6' As explained
above, the proposed regulations also contain the vague requirement
that public notice must be given when a rate cut is "significant."'63 For
ease of analysis, consider only the first reimbursement cut passed by the
California legislature.' 64 This first cut reduced California's payments to
157 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Chevron v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
158 See Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Doug-
las v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-958) 2011 WL 37o6105
at *4,.
159 See Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Indep.
LivingCtr., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL 37o6105 at *21.
16o See id.
16i Seeid. at *16.
162 See Covered Medicaid Services, supra note 2, at 26,342.
163 Id.
164 See Act of Feb. 16, 2oo8, ch. 3, §§i4, 15, 2007-2008 Cal. Stat, 3d Extraordinary Sess.
6003,6o17-19.
[Vol. 1I
AT RISK PATIENTS AND DOCTORS
various Medicaid providers by ten percent. ' 6 The proposed regulation is
not particularly helpful as written in determining whether public notice
should be required for the ten percent cut; the question remains as to
whether a ten percent cut is "significant." Now, suppose the proposed
regulations were revised to quantitatively define "significant." In a state
that already provided some of the lowest provider payment rates in the
nation, a ten percent cut would almost certainly fail quantitative analysis
and be deemed "significant."
The proposed regulations currently call for beneficiary input, but,
as explained above, the regulations would be more effective if they also
required meaningful provider input. 166 The combination of a quantitative
definition of "significant" and additional public input would ease the strain
currently on CMS to assess the impact of state budget cuts. CMS could
quickly be alerted to the decreased access concerns of both providers and
beneficiaries. Presumably, this input would include data that could save
CMS some of its investigatory costs and make agency enforcement easier.
Douglas is an example of a lengthy and costly process that would be
improved by greater agenci enforcement and strengthened proposed
regulations. A lack of agency enforcement ultimately failed the Medicaid
providers and beneficiaries of California. The state's rate cuts were not
meaningfully reviewed by CMS or the public before California attempted
to enact them.167 Instead, the providers and beneficiaries had no option
but to engage in lengthy and costly litigation that eventually landed them
in the United States Supreme Court.16 Once the consolidated Douglas
cases finally made it before the highest court, HHS determined that the
cuts were in fact valid.1 69 Had the proposed regulations been strengthened
and their parameters more clearly defined, this agency action would have
occurred much earlier, saving great time and expense.
Even if the proposed regulations are redrafted in a way that will increase
their effectiveness and enhance agency enforcement, a private cause of
action based on the Supremacy Clause is still necessary to supplement
agency action. In the event that an unlawful state rate cut is not adequately
detected by the agency, private causes of action serve as a backstop and the
last resort for Medicaid providers and beneficiaries who would otherwise
find their rights under the Medicaid Act violated.
170
Clear procedural requirements for state plans are needed to ensure that
CMS has the information and methodology it needs to more expeditiously
165 Seeid. at 6o18.
166 See supra Part III.B.
167 See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., lnc., 133 S. Ct. i204, 1208-09 (2012)..
168 See id.
169 Id. at 1209.
17o Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 158, at "16.
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spot deficiencies in the states' suggested reimbursement rate cuts. A private
cause of action is needed to bookend the agency's work by providing further
oversight of provider payment and by helping to highlight issues that may
not be clearly identifiable in the data states provide to CMS.
CONCLUSION
Similar to private causes of action for Medicaid beneficiaries under §
1983 and the Supremacy Clause, CMS's proposed access regulations face
an uncertain future. Proposed regulations generally take a long time to be
finalized and state Medicaid administrations typically fight provisions of the
regulations that call for increased state accountability' This means that
the regulations as they currently appear may undergo substantial revision
and their final form may end- up being either more or less consequential
than they currently appear.
CMS's proposed regulations need to be significantly strengthened if they
are going to aid Medicaid beneficiaries at all. As it stands now, the proposed
regulation is little more than a process to gather information. Additionally, a
private cause of action is needed under the Supremacy Clause or Medicaid
beneficiaries will be fully at the mercy of state budgets. In a time when
state budget crises are prevalent, giving states effective control over
Medicaid provider payments with no real mechanism to ensure access will
provide the states with great leeway to cut payment rates. CMS's proposed
regulations, as currently drafted, are terribly inadequate to ensure equal
access to health care for our Nation's most poor and needy citizens, which is
supposed to be the ultimate goal of Medicaid. If the proposed regulations
are not revised to provide greater protections to Medicaid providers and
beneficiaries and private causes of action to enforce beneficiary rights are
further eroded, the Equal Access provision will be rendered inoperative.
An inoperative Equal Access provision combined with the high cost of
healthcare in this country will usher America into a "dual-track" system of
healthcare more stratified than we have seen since Medicaid was enacted
in 1965.
171 Rosenbaum, supra note 43, at 103.
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